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Abstract 
To what extent do ‘consent’ and ‘intention’ continue to have a role to play in the 
process of construing the terms of contracts? Is the adoption of an increasingly 
objective approach towards the interpretative process consistent with an assertion that 
it can be equiparated to the marginalisation of the role of consent? If the dynamics of 
concession and compromise in commercial negotiations are facets of party consent, in 
what way may (if at all) the prevalence of the commercially sensible construction 
function to elide consensus? These are some of the questions which the paper 
attempts to address. 
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 1 
Introduction* 
 
To what extent do ‘consent’ and ‘intention’ continue to have a role to play in the 
process of construing the terms of contracts? Is the adoption of an increasingly 
objective approach towards the interpretative process consistent with an assertion that 
it can be equiparated to the marginalisation of the role of consent? If the dynamics of 
concession and compromise in commercial negotiations are facets of party consent, in 
what way may (if at all) the prevalence of the commercially sensible construction 
function to elide consensus?  These are some of the questions which this paper will 
attempt to address. Since contract law is one of the vessels through which voluntary 
obligations are constituted and channelled and a contract involves the exercise by an 
obligor of his will and an expression of his intention to be bound, 1 one might think 
that the consent and intention of obligor and obligee would be fundamentally crucial 
to the construction of the terms encapsulating those obligations and duties. However, 
the courts have routinely stressed that the search for the true construction of the terms 
of written or oral contracts is concerned more about what the reasonable objective 
person would consider the mutual intentions of the parties to be rather than what they 
had intended to agree subjectively (individually or collectively). One of the principal 
merits of the objective approach is said to be that it avoids unjust results generated 
from ‘unfair surprise’ and protects the reasonable reliance interests of the parties to 
the contract and those whose rights, duties and liabilities may be affected by it.2 On 
the other hand, the requirement to construe the terms of a commercial contract from 
the perspective of the objective and disinterested reasonable business outsider leaves 
the current legal position open to the charge that party autonomy and consent is 
unjustifiably overridden. This paper will strive to subject the objective standard to a 
measure of scrutiny and offer insights which serve to identify the implications of its 
application for party autonomy and consent. 
 
The interpretative process in its historical context 
 
The construction of an express term will be a live issue in the case of many contracts 
and can be contrasted with the process of interpretation stricto sensu, the latter 
process being confined to a literal translation whereas construction entails the 
attribution of meaning to words or terms from the spirit of the text.3 First, construction 
will be relevant where it is unclear whether the words which feature in the contract 
include or exclude certain circumstances, examples, factors or matters within their 
scope of application. Farnsworth has referred to this ‘scope’ factor as an example of 
what is referred to as ‘vagueness’ which is distinct from ‘ambiguity’.4  Words are 
‘ambiguous’ where the words are capable of more than one meaning or connotation. 
                                                
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at a workshop entitled The Role of Consent in Contract 
Law: Principles and Practice which was hosted by the Edinburgh Centre for Commercial Law at the 
University of Edinburgh on 7th December 2009. 
1 Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia (Vol. 15), Contract at paragraph 4. 
2 Report on Interpretation in Private Law (Scot Law Com No. 160) (1997) para. 2.6 at pp.9-10. 
3 W. W. McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland (3rd edition, Edinburgh W Green 2007) para. 8-05 
at p. 199 and E. Farnsworth, ‘“Meaning” in the Law of Contracts’ (1967) 76 Yale LJ 939, 939-940. 
Whilst respecting the prescience of this distinction, for ease of reference, the terms ‘interpretation’ and 
‘construction’ will be used interchangeably in this paper. 
4 E. Farnsworth, “”Meaning” in the Law of Contracts” (1967) 76 Yale LJ 939, 953. See also A. 
Schwartz & R. E. Scott, “Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law” 113 Yale Law Journal 541, 
570-572 (2003). 
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For example, whether the verb “cast” means ‘throw out’5 or ‘appoint’.6 Furthermore, 
as the Scottish Law Commission has pointed out, the word ‘ambiguous’ is also used 
to describe an ‘expression [which] is unclear or uncertain.’7  
 
Through careful analysis of primary sources, Clive has demonstrated that the 
traditional Scottish approach towards the construction of the terms of contracts 
followed a ‘mild’ or ‘weak’ form of subjective approach.8 The judiciary would 
attempt to ascertain the meaning of the terms agreed by the parties in the contract in 
accordance with what the parties thought they had intended to say at the time 
agreement was reached. The subjective approach is consistent with the ‘will theory’, 
i.e. that where there is a dispute, duly reflecting the consensual nature of a contract, 
the interpretative process must be focussed on the need to ascertain the collective 
intentions of the parties.9 However, by the time of Bell’s writings, the interpretative 
process had begun to drift away from a purely subjective approach towards the 
determination of the ‘mutual intentions’10 of the parties. As noted by Sir Christopher 
Staughton, the ascertainment of the parties’ ‘mutual intentions’ ‘does not necessarily 
mean what they [themselves] actually meant’,11 but instead, as Bell noted in his 
Commentaries, it is concerned with the drawing of an: 
 
‘inference, by the act of reason, or the collecting from proper indications, of the 
true meaning of the parties… [and]… according to the sense in which it was 
mutually understood and relied upon at the time of making it.’12 
 
As explained by Laura Macgregor, by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
‘remnants of a subjective approach [we]re difficult to find’13 and Scots law in this 
period is characterised by an incremental gravitation towards an objective approach 
rather than a clearly recognisable and well-defined break from the subjective stance. 
However, the approach could not be categorised as fully 100% objective in nature. 
Thus, before the decision of the House of Lords in Investors Compensation Scheme,14 
(“ICS”) on one particular reading of the position,15 the Scottish courts appeared to be 
                                                
5 As in ‘cast a net’.  
6 As in ‘Noel Coward cast Edward Woodward to play the part of…’. 
7 Report on Interpretation in Private Law (Scot Law Com No. 160) (1997) para. 2.12 at p.12. 
8 E. Clive, “Interpretation”, in K. Reid and R. Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland 
(Oxford, OUP, 2000), vol. 2, Chap. 2 at pp. 50-52, Stair, Institutions IV.42.20 and 21, Bankton, 
Institute IV.45.50 and Report on Interpretation in Private Law (Scot Law Com No. 160) (1997) para. 
1.16 at pp. 4-5. 
9 Report on Interpretation in Private Law (Scot Law Com No. 160) (1997) para. 1.14 at p. 4 and E. 
Clive, “Interpretation”, in K. Reid and R. Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland 
(Oxford, OUP, 2000), vol. 2, Chap. 2 at pp. 50-52. 
10 The limitations of seeking to ascertain the ‘intention’ of a contracting party or the ‘mutual intentions’ 
of the contracting parties are explored comprehensively in W. W. McBryde, The Law of Contract in 
Scotland (3rd edition, Edinburgh W Green 2007) para. 8-03 at p. 196-197. 
11 Sir C. Staughton, “How do the Courts Interpret Commercial Contracts?” [1999] Cambridge Law 
Journal 303, 305. Writer’s annotations in square brackets. 
12 Bell, Commentaries, I, 455-456 (7th edition from 1870 by M’Laren); 
13 L. MacGregor and C. Lewis, “Interpretation of Contract”, in R. Zimmermann, D.Visser and K. Reid 
(eds), Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective (Oxford, OUP, 2004), Chap. 3 at p. 69. 
14 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896. 
15 For an alternative, more circumspect, view, see E. Clive, “Interpretation”, in K. Reid and R. 
Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland (Oxford, OUP, 2000), vol. 2, Chap. 2 at pp. 
47-49 and the references to Scottish cases such as Bank of Scotland v Stewart (1891) 18 R 957, Baird’s 
Trs. v Baird & Co. (1877) 4 R 1005, Hunter v Barron’s Trs. (1886) 13 R 883 and Jopp’s Trs. v 
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confined to looking at the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the contract 
where the scope of application of the words was unclear, the words were capable of 
more than one interpretation, or they were latently ambiguous (i.e. the words or 
expressions deployed in the written commercial contract appeared to be clear, but the 
surrounding circumstances pointed to the presence of an ambiguity).16 By and large, 
in the cases decided according to Scots law prior to ICS the interpretative process was 
generally characterised by references to the natural and ordinary meaning which the 
words employed duly conveyed - which was a matter of ‘impression’17 or dictionary 
definition. In theory at least, the courts were only allowed to look at the factual matrix 
and circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the contract where it had held that 
the words possessed no plain meaning. 
 
Whilst Lord Bingham has argued that Lord Hoffmann’s approach in ICS was nothing 
like the sort of departure from the position adopted and applied by the common law 
courts in cases decided according to English law or Scots law before 1997,18 it is 
suggested that whilst there is certainly more than a kernel of truth in that contention, 
something seismic has occurred since 1997. It may be more a change of emphasis or 
mindset as opposed to a real palpable change in the applicable law, but a change it is 
nonetheless. The variety of reactions to Lord Hoffmann’s approach in ICS provide 
some evidence that the propositions drawn in the decision have been perceived to 
have been far from insignificant.19 At the very least, Scots law can be said to have 
gone on something of a journey since the reception of ICS in Bank of Scotland v 
Dunedin Property Investment Co Ltd.20 and it may be that this voyage can be 
conceptualised as a process of doctrinal affiliation giving way to pragmatic 
inclinations. It is suggested that the current method is perhaps symptomatic of a legal 
system which is adapting its rules of construction to respond to ever longer and more 
complex commercial contracts in light of rapid economic and technological 
developments. Indeed, ICS has established something akin to a presumptional shift 
which is equivalent to a greater sub-conscious willingness to apply a contextual, 
rather than a formalistic and literal, analysis. If that is the minimum which has 
occurred, it is submitted that, in itself, it is noteworthy for the repercussions which it 
                                                                                                                                       
Edmond (1888) 15 R 271 in Lord Bingham of Cornhill’s contribution in “A New Thing Under the Sun: 
The Interpretation of Contract and the ICS Decision” (2008) 12 Edinburgh Law Review 374, 376 and 
390. The case of Miller v Mair (1860) 22 D 660 is another example of a Scottish case where the 
surrounding context superseded the ordinary and natural meaning of the words and can be added to the 
Scottish cases of the ilk which Lord Bingham referred to in the said article. 
16 See Gloag, Contract (2nd edn, 1929) 399-400; Crosse v Bankes (1886) 13 R (HL) 40 at 41, per Lord 
Halsbury LC where he refers to the requirement to read and understand words in their 'ordinary and 
natural sense' as an 'ordinary rule of construction’. See also M W Wilson (Lace) Ltd. v Eagle Star 
Insurance Co. Ltd. 1993 S.L.T. 938 at 942 and 947 per Lord Justice Clerk Ross and Lord Kirkwood 
respectively. However, there is an argument that there is something particularly suspect in using 
‘context’ to dislodge the clear meaning of words to create a latent ambiguity and then to subsequently 
re-apply the ‘context’ again to cure that latent ambiguity. 
17 The word adopted by Lord Justice Clerk Ross and Lord Kirkwood respectively in M W Wilson 
(Lace) Ltd. v Eagle Star Insurance Co. Ltd. 1993 S.L.T. 938 at 942 and 947. 
18 “A New Thing Under the Sun: The Interpretation of Contract and the ICS Decision” (2008) 12 
Edinburgh Law Review 374-390. 
19 See the reactions to the decision summarised by Lord Bingham of Cornhill in “A New Thing Under 
the Sun: The Interpretation of Contract and the ICS Decision” (2008) 12 Edinburgh Law Review 374, 
381-388, referred to as ‘the hostile, ‘the wary’ and ‘the approving’. 
20 1998 SC 657. 
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has for the significance of party consent and intention in this particular branch of 
Scots contract law. 
 
The Current Position 
 
The recent ‘shift’ in position in Scots law is vouchsafed by the judgment of Lord 
Philip in City Wall Properties (Scotland) Limited v Pearl Assurance plc: 
 
“… the court begins its consideration of the construction of a contractual 
provision already equipped with the information available as to the circumstances 
surrounding the contract, and that information is brought to bear on the court's 
consideration from the beginning. The court does not begin by looking at the 
words themselves, as it were in a vacuum, without reference to the surrounding 
circumstances, in order to ascertain whether they have a plain meaning or 
whether there is an ambiguity. To adopt that approach, it seems to me, is to 
assimilate so far as possible, the way in which the document is interpreted to the 
common sense principles by which any serious utterance would be interpreted in 
ordinary life, and to discard “the old intellectual baggage of ‘legal’ interpretation”. 
If I am right in that interpretation, it was not necessary for the Lord Ordinary to 
decide that the words [in the contract] were ambiguous before he could deploy 
the evidence of the surrounding circumstances.”21 
 
It is also evident in the judgment of Lord Reed in Credential Bath Street Ltd v 
Venture Investment Placement Ltd.22 where his Lordship disapproved of the 
contention that words have a meaning outside their context and highlighted the fact 
that Lord Hoffmann’s approach had been followed many times by the House of 
Lords. Nevertheless, it has also been said that the court should not search for any 
ambiguity where the words have only one natural and ordinary meaning and are 
incapable of more than one interpretation.23 
 
Notwithstanding Lord Philip’s opinion in City Wall, there continue to be a great 
number of cases decided by the judiciary in Scotland subsequent to ICS where the 
                                                
21 City Wall Properties (Scotland) Limited v Pearl Assurance plc [2007] CSIH 79 at para. [22]. 
Writer’s emphases in italics and annotations in square brackets. A similar approach was adopted in 
Waydale Ltd. v DHL Holdings (UK) Ltd. (No. 2). 2001 S.L.T. 224, 228 per Lord Hamilton (the benefit 
of the rights of a landlord under a guarantee was held to transmit to singular successors based on the 
surrounding circumstances and the commercially sensible construction), Hardie Polymers Ltd. v 
Polymerland Ltd. 2002 S.C.L.R. 64, 74 per Lord Macfadyen (clause in an agency agreement headed 
‘Compensation After termination’ held to confer a right to an indemnity in favour of an agent on 
termination based on the surrounding circumstances and the context of the clause and the contract as a 
whole), Howgate Shopping Centre Ltd. v GLS 164 Ltd. 2002 S.L.T. 820, Howgate Shopping Centre 
Ltd. v Catercraft Services Ltd. 2004 S.L.T. 231, 241 at para. [35] per Lord Macfadyen (discount to 
open market rental value for the purposes of a rent review enured for the benefit of the prior tenant and 
did not transmit to an assignee), MRS Distribution Ltd. v DS Smith (UK) Ltd. 2004 S.L.T. 631, 
Hutchison v Cameron 2005 S.C.L.R. 773, Royal Scottish Assurance v Scottish Equitable (No. 2) [2005] 
CSOH 08; 2005 GWD 13-221 at para. [22] per Lord Bracadale and Emcor Drake & Scull Ltd. v 
Edinburgh Royal Joint Venture 2005 S.L.T.1233 at 1244–1245 per Lord Drummond Young. 
22 2008 Hous. L.R. 2, 6-7 at paras. [15]-[17]. 
23 Warren James (Jewellers) Ltd. v Overgate Group Ltd. [2007] CSIH 14. This perhaps reflects an 
underlying judicial intolerance to the notion that ‘context’ can be deployed to dislodge the clear 
meaning of words to create a latent ambiguity and then subsequently re-applied to correct that latent 
ambiguity, see n 16 above. 
 5 
courts have stipulated that it will not always be necessary to have resort to the 
surrounding circumstances on the basis that the words employed are unambiguous 
and have a natural and ordinary meaning.24 The most compelling example is the 
recent judgment of Sir David Edward QC in the case of Multi-Link Leisure 
Developments Ltd. v North Lanarkshire Council25 decided by the Inner House. 
Having doubted whether the contextual approach advanced by Lord Hoffmann in ICS 
formed part of Scots law, Sir David Edward QC asserted that ‘[o]ur inquiry should 
start (and will finish) by asking what is the ordinary meaning of the words used.’26 
Other cases in the same mould are Bank of Scotland v Frank James Junior,27 
Loudonhill Contracts Ltd. v John Mowlem Construction Ltd.,28 Glasgow City Council 
v Caststop Ltd.,29 Atradius Credit Insurance NV v Whyte & Mackay Ltd.,30 
Middlebank Ltd v University of Dundee,31 Autolink Concessionaires (M6) plc v Amey 
Construction Ltd.32 and Forbo-Nairn Ltd. v Murrayfield Properties Ltd..33 All of the 
aforementioned cases explicitly or impliedly rely on the judgment of Lord Rodger in 
Bank of Scotland v Dunedin Property Investment Co Ltd.34 In Dunedin Property 
Investment, Lord Rodger directed that he found it  ‘…helpful to start where Lord 
Mustill began…in Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan…’35 In Charter Reinsurance, 
Lord Mustill had stated: 
 
‘I believe that most expressions do have a natural meaning, in the sense of their 
meaning in ordinary speech…[t]he inquiry will start, and usually finish, by 
asking what is the ordinary meaning of the words used’.36   
 
The upshot of this analysis is that one might consider Scots law as possessing two 
(not necessarily opposing) streams of authority travelling in parallel directions. 
However, this would perhaps be stretching the true position too far, since whether a 
court adopts the first or the second approach is unlikely to make a great deal of 
difference to the outcome. Indeed, it is more the case that is ‘a matter of choice 
whether a judge in his reasoning first analyses the background facts before 
considering the relevant contractual provisions or looks first at the provision before 
testing his view of it against those facts.’37 Nevertheless, on balance, it is submitted 
that the primacy of the surrounding circumstances and the application of the 
commercially sensible construction as the principal interpretative instruments is a 
paramount consideration, so that whilst the position in Scots law is not wholly free 
                                                
24 For a discussion of what ‘natural’, ‘plain’ or ‘ordinary’ meaning of words might mean in different 
contexts, see J. W. Carter and E. Peden, ‘The ‘Natural Meaning’ of Contracts’ (2005) 21 Journal of 
Contract Law 277. 
25 [2009] CSIH 96. 
26 [2009] CSIH 96 at para. [25]. 
27 1999 S.C.L.R. 284, 291 per Lord Penrose. 
28 2000 S.C.L.R. 111, 115 per Lord Rodger. 
29 2002 SLT 47, 57 per Lord Macfadyen (OH) and Glasgow City Council v Caststop Ltd. 2003 S.L.T. 
526 at 531C per Lord Kirkwood (IH). 
30 [2005] CSOH 23 at para. [43] per Lord Drummond Young. 
31 [2006] CSOH 202 at para. [13] per Lord Drummond Young. 
32 [2009] CSIH 14 at para. [23] per Lord Kingarth. 
33 [2009] CSIH 94. 
34 1998 SC 657 
35 1998 SC 657 at 661. 
36 Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan [1997] AC 313 at 384.  
37 Luminar Lava Ignite Ltd v Mama Group plc & Mean Fiddler Holdings Ltd. [2010] CSIH 01; 2010 
G.W.D. 3-39 at para. [38] per Lord Hodge. 
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from doubt, the writer would adopt the description advanced by Macgregor which 
posits that: 
 
“… the Scottish courts no longer consider themselves absolutely bound to find an 
ambiguity prior to hearing evidence of the surrounding circumstances.”38  
 
As noted by Lord Hodge in Luminar Lava Ignite Ltd v Mama Group plc & Mean 
Fiddler Holdings Ltd.,39 the end result is that the factual matrix, surrounding 
circumstances and commercially sensible construction all operate at the forefront of 
the interpretative process rather than lurking somewhere towards the background. 
 
What is the distinction between a subjective and objective approach? 
 
At this juncture, it is perhaps beneficial to pause, take a step back and subject the 
distinction between a subjective and objective approach to much closer scrutiny.40 
The oft-versed assertion, which one would suggest is more of a caricature than a 
reality, is that legal systems based on the civilian tradition such as Germany,41 
France42 and Italy43 are more subjective in their approach to contractual interpretation 
than common law systems such as England. The inquiry is concerned with revealing 
the personal intent of the parties in accordance with the will theory. However, such a 
clichéd observation does a disservice to the subtlety of the interpretative approaches 
harnessed in legal systems grounded in the Civilian tradition. As Professors 
Vogenauer,44 Markesinis, Unberath and Johnston45 have accurately observed, the 
divide between civil law and common law systems is not as clear-cut as might first 
appear.46 Thus, it is somewhat artificial to talk of legal systems as having a 100% 
subjective or objective measure of scrutiny. Nevertheless, constructing the indicators 
and hallmarks of such polar opposites is useful inasmuch as it enables a spectrum to 
                                                
38 See L. MacGregor and C. Lewis, “Interpretation of Contract”, in R. Zimmermann, D. Visser and K. 
Reid (eds), Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective (Oxford, OUP, 2004), Chap. 3 at p. 81. 
39 [2010] CSIH 01; 2010 G.W.D. 3-39 at para. [38]: 
“… I see no error in law in the Lord Ordinary’s approach of considering first the words in 
question and then reassessing his view of them after having regard to the relevant background 
circumstances. It is not part of our law of contract that the court can have regard to relevant 
background circumstances only if there is ambiguity in the words of an agreement. The Lord 
Ordinary is supported by Lord Mustil’s view, which he quotes, that in most cases “the enquiry 
will start, and usually finish, by asking what is the ordinary meaning of the words used” – 
Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan [1997] AC 313 at p.384B-C.” 
40 See the discussion in S Vogenauer “Interpretation of Contracts: Concluding  
Comparative Observations” in A Burrows and E Peel (eds.) Contract Terms (Oxford,  
OUP, 2007) 123, 125-129. 
41 §133 BGB: “When a declaration of intent is interpreted, it is necessary to ascertain the true intention 
rather than adhering to the literal meaning of the declaration.” 
42 Arts. 1156-1165 Code Civile: “One must in agreements seek what the common intention of the 
contracting parties was, rather than pay attention to the literal meaning of the terms.” 
43 Arts. 1362-1367 Codice Civile: “In interpreting contracts, one must ascertain what was the common 
intention of the parties and one must not limit oneself to a consideration of the literal meaning of the 
words deployed.” 
44 S Vogenauer “Interpretation of Contracts: Concluding Comparative Observations” 
in A Burrows and E Peel (eds.) Contract Terms (Oxford, OUP, 2007) 123, 149-150. 
45 B Markesinis, H Unberath, A Johnston, The German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise, 2nd 
edition (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006) 136. 
46 See also Report on Interpretation in Private Law (Scot Law Com No. 160) (1997) para. 1.18 at p.5 
and E. Clive, “Interpretation”, in K. Reid and R. Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in 
Scotland (Oxford, OUP, 2000), vol. 2, Chap. 2 at pp. 47-49 and 70-71. 
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be drawn, against which the approaches of Scots law and other legal systems can be 
plotted.  To that extent, it is submitted that a purely subjective assessment would 
enjoin a court to consider what the parties individually or collectively intended to say 
in complete ignorance of the terms or words deployed. In this context, as Lord Reed 
noted in Credential Bath Street Ltd v Venture Investment Placement Ltd., it is crucial 
to recognise the distinction between the individual and collective intentions of the 
parties.47 A search for the former would be undertaken by definition in isolation of the 
other contracting parties’ intentions which is particularly unsound. Further, the 
interpretative process in Scots law has never involved the search for the former nor 
the latter in the absence of consideration of the words used. However, an examination 
of the latter in light of the terms of the written instrument did indeed pertain at one 
time under the leitmotif of the ‘mutual intention of the parties’.  
 
A 100% subjective examination can be contrasted with a purely objective approach. 
In strict terms, a determination which is 100% objective would empower the court to 
substitute its own judgment as to what was expressed for that of the parties. In terms 
of this formula, the court would second guess the judgment or intentions of the 
parties. A particularly emphatic description of an objective test was expounded by Rix 
LJ in Socimer International Bank Ltd (in liquidation) v Standard Bank London Ltd.48 
where he stated that on the application of an objective standard, ‘the decision maker 
becomes the court itself’. A purely objective examination would also empower the 
court to completely disregard the views and understandings of the contracting parties 
themselves. In such an extreme case, party autonomy, consent and intention would be 
completely overridden and it is clear that this is not what is happening where the 
current rules of interpretation are applied by the courts. At this juncture, it should also 
be noted that if one were to chart the subjective/objective spectrum, this would not 
coincide with another spectrum ranging from a 100% literal construction at one end of 
the scale to a 100% contextual approach at the other end (insofar as it is possible to 
conceive of the interpretative process as flowing seamlessly in terms of such a 
spectrum at all). The subjective approach does not entail consideration of the text in 
isolation, but rather the process can be conceived as an exercise in delving into the 
heads of the contracting parties and identifying their genuine and honest beliefs. 
Likewise, whilst the application of an objective approach enjoins a court to engage 
with the context, this is not so radical as to grant a licence to the court to ignore the 
text of the contract. Instead, it is suggested that the relationship between subjective, 
objective, literal and contextual approaches is more subtle and can be drawn in terms 
of an irregularly shaped trapezium, which might be plotted in the following manner: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
                                                
47 Credential Bath Street Ltd v Venture Investment Placement Ltd. 2008 Hous. L.R. 2, 9 at para. [28]. 
48 [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 558, 577, para. 66. 
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The question which arises is where the Scots law approach to contractual 
interpretation is located on the subjective/objective spectrum painted above. The 
answer is that it probably lies somewhere towards the right of the median, since it 
would be absurd to contend that the current law is devoid of any subjective 
considerations. Perhaps the best way to understand the nature of the scrutiny applied 
by a court is to conceptualise it as involving the application of a ‘strong’ objective 
measure duly tempered by a ‘weak’ subjective strand. The approach is best 
understood as one which clings to a mixed subjective/objective approach since it is 
subjective to the extent that the focus on the surrounding circumstances relates to 
factors which pertained to the contracting parties at the time of formation and it is 
objective inasmuch as those factors are examined in light of what they would have 
meant to the reasonable business person ‘aware of the commercial context in which 
the contract occurs’.49 Thus, the court is not applying its own judgment as to what was 
stated and overriding party consent, intention or autonomy. Rather, it is reaching a 
conclusion based objectively on what a reasonable business person stepping into the 
shoes of the parties would have considered to be the appropriate construction. A 
related critique of the approach of Scots law to construction is that the wider the scope 
of the ‘surrounding circumstances’ and the greater the importance afforded to the 
technique of the ‘commercially sensible construction’,50 the more objective the 
process becomes and the greater the licence given to the judiciary to be creative. This 
may appear to be accurate, but it should not be taken too far or at face value, since the 
creativity of the courts is constrained by the aforementioned subjective element 
inherent within the process and as noted by Lord Drummond Young in MRS 
Distribution Ltd. v DS Smith (UK) Ltd.51 the validity of such an argument is 
somewhat marginalised by the very nature of the Scottish system of written pleadings 
                                                
49 Melville Dundas Ltd. v Hotel Corporation of Edinburgh Ltd. 2007 SC 12, 23 at para. [17] per Lord 
Drummond Young. 
50 The commercial reality approach may be a tributary of the rule that absurd meanings are rejected, see 
L. MacGregor and C. Lewis, “Interpretation of Contract”, in R. Zimmermann, D. Visser and K. Reid 
(eds), Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective (Oxford, OUP, 2004), Chap. 3 at p. 91 and W. 
W. McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland (3rd edition, Edinburgh W Green 2007) para. 8-12 at p. 
202. 
51 2004 S.L.T. 631, 638 at para. [14]. 
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and other subjective interpretative factors which will be considered in more detail 
below. 
 
Does the current objective approach encroach upon the territory traditionally 
reserved to other rules or areas of contract law? 
 
One might argue that the modern contextual approach which is applied towards 
contractual interpretation has serious repercussions for other legal principles, rule and 
doctrines of contract law. If this is so, one must ask what the implications may be for 
party consent and autonomy. Generally, it may appear that the objective approach acts 
as a territorial aggressor in such a fashion, but, on balance, it is submitted that in most 
cases, it does not. First, an issue which emerges is whether the law of contractual 
interpretation encroaches upon the territory which is the traditional and natural habitat 
of the law of error. For example, in the case of Credential Bath Street Ltd v Venture 
Investment Placement Ltd.,52 Lord Reed provided that the interpretative process can 
be deployed to identify mistakes in expression contained in contracts and apply a 
construction which is consistent with the parties’ shared meaning, but which may 
differ from the terms of the clause as drafted. One might argue that this is precisely 
what Lord Reed appears to have done in the case of Macdonald Estates plc v 
Regenesis (2005) Dunfermline Ltd.53 The Regenesis case concerned a joint venture 
entered into between a property owner and a property developer. In terms of a 
management services agreement (“MSA”), it was provided that the joint venture 
company (“JVCo”) would ‘free and relieve [the property developer] on demand of all 
outlays reasonably required to be made by it as an incident of the performance of its 
obligations … and the provision of the Services.’ Thus, on the face of it, the MSA 
directed that the JVCo was bound to indemnify the property developer in respect of 
all reasonably incurred costs, including those which the JVCo had made in connection 
with the Services provided by the property developer to the JVCo. Nevertheless, Lord 
Reed concluded that: 
 
“The words “it” and “its” [in the MSA] must be a mistake: the [JVCo] could 
not sensibly be undertaking to relieve the [property developer] of outlays 
which the [JVCo] had themselves made. Those words must be understood as 
meaning “you” and “your.”54  
 
Thus, one might contend that the inherent power of the court to rectify mistakes 
through the process of interpretation appears to invade the territory occupied by the 
law of error in consent. However, the present writer would reject such a view. First, 
there is abundant evidence that the courts have always been prepared to treat words as 
pro non scripto or substitute words where there has clearly been a mistake in the 
drafting. Traditionally, this has been treated as part of the package of responsibilities 
discharged by the rules of contractual interpretation.55 Secondly, and more 
significantly, to adopt such a position confuses the distinction between the law of 
error in consent where the parties have effectively concluded no agreement and the 
situation where agreement has been reached, but a clerical mistake has been made in 
                                                
52 2008 Hous. L.R. 2, 7-9 at paras. [17]-[24]. 
53 2007 SLT 791. 
54 2007 SLT 791, 813 at para. [114]. Writer’s annotations in square brackets. 
55 See the discussion by W. W. McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland (3rd edition, Edinburgh W 
Green 2007) para. 8-98 – 8-99 at pp. 236-237. 
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the drafting – which is the case here. For that reasoning, arguments about the 
marginalisation of the role of the law of error in consent are unconvincing and miss 
the point. 
 
A second, related argument is that the more contextual approach to construction 
operates to narrow the rule that the courts cannot use their powers to substitute, add or 
interpolate words in contracts. Does the ICS contextual approach inflict some degree 
of intrusive surgery on this rule? Here, the judgment of Lord Reed in Credential Bath 
Street Ltd v Venture Investment Placement Ltd.56 is instructive. Lord Reed recognised 
that it would be rare for a court to substitute, add or interpolate words on the basis (a) 
that to do so would render the clause or contract more commercially sensible or (b) 
the surrounding circumstances. The rationale for such an approach is that the contract 
may simply amount to a bad bargain from which a party should not be saved on 
fairness grounds. The courts will not rewrite a contract for the parties, and in the 
words of Lord Hoffmann in Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd.,57 in 
such a case, ‘the loss lies where it falls.’58 Nevertheless, the objective construction 
may be harnessed to empower a court to substitute, replace, add or interpolate words 
where in the words of Lord Hoffmann in ICS, “something must have gone wrong with 
the language” or that the natural reading of the clause would “attribute to the parties 
an intention which they plainly could not have had.”59 One might also refer to the 
speech of Lord Diplock in The Antaios Compania Naviera SA v Salen Rederierna AB, 
where his Lordship opined that where the natural reading of the words produces “a 
conclusion that flouts business commonsense”,60 the contextual approach may be 
deployed to add or interpolate words.61 Furthermore, in Hombourg Houtimport BV v 
Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin), Lord Bingham observed that words may be added 
or interpolated where “it is clear … that words have been omitted.”62 The language 
employed by Lords Hoffmann, Diplock and Bingham demonstrate that recourse to the 
raw tools of contractual interpretation to add or subtract terms or words will be rare 
indeed, since the threshold is set at a particularly high level. For that reason, it is 
submitted that the successful application of such a technique will be exceptional 
which renders it unlikely that the interpretative process will be applied as a means of 
overriding the shared intention of the parties. 
 
Another more compelling argument is that the current rules on contractual 
interpretation function to narrow the scope of relevance of the law of rectification. 
The wider the scope of the interpretative task, the greater the ineffectiveness of the 
statutory provisions on rectification.63 The contention is that the once neat and clean 
dividing line which existed between the role of the law of construction as an 
interpretative endeavour and the role of the law of rectification as performing a 
corrective and adaptive function appears to have collapsed. This debate may be 
                                                
56 2008 Hous. L.R. 2, 8-9 and 11 at paras. [24]-[25] and [36-37] per Lord Reed. 
57 [2009] 1 WLR 1988 (PC). 
58 [2009] 1 WLR 1988, 1993D (PC). 
59 ICS [1998] 1 WLR, 896, 912–913. 
60 [1985] AC 191, 201. 
61 See also Lord Bingham [2004] 1 A.C. 715, 741 at para. [23]. 
62 [2004] 1 A.C. 715, 741 at para. [23]. 
63 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985, s. 8(1(a). See also G. McMeel, “The 
Principles and Policies of Contractual Construction” in A Burrows and E Peel (eds.) Contract Terms 
(Oxford, OUP, 2007) 27, 35-36 and A Burrows, “Construction and Rectification” in A Burrows and E 
Peel (eds.) Contract Terms (Oxford, OUP, 2007) 77. 
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shirked and left Peter Webster who will speak in more depth on the topic of 
rectification.64 However, the very least that can be said at this point is that the 
techniques of construction and rectification cannot be distinguished by invoking the 
subjective/objective continuum which was explored above: It would be erroneous to 
assert that construction is more concerned about discovering the meaning which the 
terms of a document would convey to a reasonable and objective business outsider 
standing in the shoes of the contracting parties, whereas rectification is about the 
correction of defective expressions as a means of realising the subjective ‘common’65 
and ‘actual (not deemed)’66 intentions of the contracting parties. Instead, if the two 
processes of construction and rectification were to be plotted on the 
subjective/objective spectrum, they would both be marked off at corresponding 
locations, since both entail the application of objective elements.67 
 
Finally, there is considerable force in the assertion that the current interpretative 
process is not only influencing, but indeed usurping, the traditional role fulfilled by 
the rules on the implication of terms. In 1999, Sean Smith, advocate opined: 
 
“The problem with [the approach in ICS] is that it appears to stray 
uncomfortably away from interpretation, strictly speaking, and towards the 
implication of terms... [and the] result [is] that the distinction between 
interpretation and implication becomes blurred.”68 
 
Of course, if true, this is problematic, since the threshold for the implication of terms 
is one of necessity,69 whereas the threshold for interpretation of terms is 
reasonableness, i.e. the ‘reasonable business person’. Here, there is a discrepancy in 
the relevant standard, despite the fact that the width of enquiry which is required 
pursuant to the contextual approach to construction strays over into the process of 
                                                
64 P. Webster, “The Role of Consent in Contract Law: Principles and Practice: Rectification” [Full 
citation to be completed]. 
65 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985, s. 8(1(a). 
66 See Shaw v William Grant (Minerals) Ltd. 1989 SLT 121n, 121 per Lord McCluskey. The soundness 
of Lord McCluskey’s subjective approach was doubted by Lord Reed in Macdonald Estates plc v 
Regenesis (2005) Dunfermline Ltd. 2007 SLT 791, 822-823 at paras. [161]-[165]. 
67 For example, in Rehman v Ahmad 1993 SLT 741, 752 Lord Penrose was of the view that the 
adoption by the legislature of the words ‘common intention’ in the Law Reform (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985, s. 8(1(a) enjoined the court to apply an objective approach. In 
Macdonald Estates plc v Regenesis (2005) Dunfermline Ltd. 2007 SLT 791, 822-823 at paras. [161]-
[165] Lord Reed adopted the ‘provisional view’ (rather than conclusive opinion) that Lord Penrose’s 
approach in Rehman was sound. 
68 S C Smith, “Making Sense of Contracts” 1999 SLT (News) 307, 310-311. See also K. Lewison, The 
Interpretation of Contracts, 4th edn. (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2007) 196-198. 
69 For implied terms in fact, see The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64, 68, Liverpool City Council v Irwin 
[1977] AC 239, 258B-C per Lord Cross, William Morton & Co. v Muir Brothers & Co. 1907 SC 1211, 
1224 per Lord M’Laren, McWhirter v Longmuir 1948 SC 577, 589 per Lord Jamieson and J & H 
Ritchie Ltd. v Lloyd Ltd. 2007 SC (HL) 89, 94-95 per Lord Hope. For the minimum that is required to 
imply terms in law into a particular contract, see Lister v Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co. [1957] AC 
555, 576 per Viscount Simonds, Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239, 255 per Lord 
Wilberforce, Scally v Southern Health and Social Services Board [1991] IRLR 522, 525 at para. [12] 
per Lord Bridge, Spring v Guardian Assurance Plc [1995] 2 A.C. 296, 339 and 354 per Lords Bridge 
and Oliver respectively; Johnson v Unisys Ltd. [2001] IRLR 279, 286 at para [35] per Lord Hoffmann; 
Reid v Rush and Tompkins Group plc [1989] IRLR 265, 269 per Gibson LJ and Tai Hing Cotton Mill 
Ltd. v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd. [1986] AC 80, 104–105 per Scarman LJ and Gloag, Contract (2nd 
edn, 1929) 286. 
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implication. Moreover, since the recent decision of the Privy Council in Attorney 
General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd.,70it is submitted that matters have become 
even more obscured and it is arguable that the roles of construction and implication 
have travelled further down the road towards outright conflation. The advice of the 
board was delivered by Lord Hoffmann who opined that both the construction and 
implication of terms necessitated an objective enquiry. The following excerpt from 
the Board’s judgment delivered by Lord Hoffmann repays careful consideration: 
 
“…the Board will make some general observations about the process of 
implication. The court has no power to improve upon the instrument which it 
is called upon to construe, whether it be a contract, a statute or articles of 
association. It cannot introduce terms to make it fairer or more reasonable. It is 
concerned only to discover what the instrument means. However, that 
meaning is not necessarily or always what the authors or parties to the 
document would have intended. It is the meaning which the instrument would 
convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which 
would reasonably be available to the audience to whom the instrument is 
addressed: see Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building 
Society [1998] 1 WLR 896, 912—913. It is this objective meaning which is 
conventionally called the intention of the parties, or the intention of 
Parliament, or the intention of whatever person or body was or is deemed to 
have been the author of the instrument.”71 
 
Whilst the above passage could fuel a further academic paper by itself, duly exploring 
its implications for the relationship between the processes of construction and 
implication, the writer would prefer not to deviate from the principal theme of consent 
in this workshop. In that vein, it is particularly noteworthy that the endeavour pursued 
in the context of the implication of terms is about ascertaining the ‘presumed 
intention’ of the parties,72 rather than the actual intentions of the parties which it has 
been suggested is the purpose of the law of rectification.73 For that reason, it is 
contended that the obfuscation of the threshold between the process of construction 
and implication of terms inflicts no harm upon the central notions of consent, 
autonomy and intention in contract law. 
 
Does the current objective approach foster unwarranted judicial creativity and 
the marginalisation of party consent, intention and autonomy? 
 
The current approach to contractual interpretation adopted by the Scottish courts 
places great importance on the background knowledge which was, or ought 
reasonably to have been, available to the parties, the circumstances surrounding the 
inception of the contract, the whole matrix of facts and the commercially sensible 
construction. These factors undoubtedly enjoin a court to apply an objective measure 
of scrutiny to their task at hand. However, as has already been noted, this is duly 
                                                
70 [2009] 1 WLR 1988 (PC). 
71 [2009] 1 WLR 1988, 1993A-C (PC). 
72 Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239, 266E per Lord Edmund-Davies and Attorney 
General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd. [2009] 1 WLR 1988, 1993C (PC) per Lord Hoffmann. See also 
K. Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts, 4th edn. (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2007) 191 and 194. 
73 Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd. v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337, 346 at para. [5] 
per Mason J 
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constrained by the subjective element referred to above, i.e. the need for the objective 
business outsider to step into the shoes of the contracting parties. The courts’ 
interpretative task is further tempered by subjective factors which may or may not be 
appropriate to consider or consult depending on the facts of the case. For example, 
where the parties have adopted a ‘private dictionary’, the subjective meaning 
understood by the parties must be applied by the courts.74 A similar rule is that special 
or technical words or terms should be construed according to that special or technical 
sense where this is the meaning understood by the parties.75 Furthermore, terms which 
are understood as having a particular meaning through custom and usage ought to 
yield to that construction.76  
 
However, the hostility of the courts to the admissibility of documents which are 
reflective of the pre-contractual understandings of the parties, which was recently re-
asserted by Lord Hoffmann in Chartbrook Ltd. v Persimmon Homes Ltd.77 does limit 
the scope to which subjective factors will be taken into account. Likewise, the rule 
against the admissibility of evidence of the subsequent conduct of the parties as an aid 
to construction78 arguably achieves the same effect. Here, adopting the approach of 
Lord Hoffmann in Chartbrook Ltd. v Persimmon Homes Ltd.,79 evidential materials 
such as pre-contractual communings or subsequent conduct are categorised as being 
indicative of subjective, rather than subjective factors. Interestingly, academic, 
judicial and practitioner commentators have indicated that the principle against the 
admissibility of subsequent conduct is one which is difficult to sustain and which is 
ripe for reform.80 Indeed, continental jurisdictions81 harbour no concerns in relation to 
the admissibility of such subsequent actings and neither does the Draft Common 
Frame of Reference.82 Here, I would echo the sentiments of Lord Bingham to the 
effect that ‘I would not put money on [the] survival [of the rule against admitting 
evidence of subsequent conduct]’.83 Another difficulty lies in drawing the line 
between evidence which amounts to ‘pre-contractual negotiations’, which of course, 
                                                
74 W. W. McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland (3rd edition, Edinburgh W Green 2007) para. 8-
50 at p. 219 
75 Gloag, Contract (2nd edn, 1929) 365 and 400. This is an old rule, e.g. see Coutts & Co. (1758) Mor. 
11549, Carricks v Saunders (1850) 12 D 812 and 922. A more modern example is Leverstop Ltd v 
Starling 1993 GWD 23-1461. 
76 Gloag, Contract (2nd edn, 1929) 378-381. This is probably an aspect of the rule that technical words 
should be given a technical meaning. 
77 [2009] UKHL 38; [2009] 1 AC 1101. 
78 Cameron (Scotland) Ltd v Melville Dundas Ltd 2001 SCLR 691, 695-696 at paras. [27]-[31] per 
Lord Hamilton, Westbury Estates Ltd. v The Royal Bank of Scotland plc 2006 SLT 1143, 1151 at para. 
[38] per Lord Reed and Ballast plc v Laurieston Properties Ltd. (In Liquidation) and others [2005] 
CSOH 16 at paras. [157]-[159] per Lady Paton. 
79 [2009] UKHL 38; [2009] 1 AC 1101, 1119B-C at para. [38]. 
80 J. Steyn, “The Intractable Problem of the Interpretation of Legal Texts” (2003) Sydney Law Review 
5, 10, G. McMeel, “Prior Negotiations and Subsequent Conduct-The Next Step Forward for 
Contractual Interpretation?” (2003) 119 Law Quarterly Review 272, 293-297, D. (Lord) Nicholls, “My 
Kingdom for a Horse: The Meaning of Words” (2005) 121 Law Quarterly Review 577, 586 and 588-
589, T. Bingham, “A New Thing Under the Sun: The Interpretation of Contract and the ICS Decision” 
(2008) 12 Edinburgh Law Review 374, 390 and D. McLauchlan, “Contract Interpretation: What is it 
About?” (2009) 31 Sydney Law Review 5, 42-47. 
81 Codice Civile, Art. 1362: “In order to ascertain the common intention of the parties, one must assess 
the totality of their conduct, including conduct subsequent to the contract”. 
82 DCFR II. – 8:102(1)(a) and (b). 
83 T. Bingham, “A New Thing Under the Sun: The Interpretation of Contract and the ICS Decision” 
(2008) 12 Edinburgh Law Review 374, 390. 
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is inadmissible and evidence which forms part of the surrounding circumstances or 
the parties’ background knowledge, which indeed may be had regard to by a court.84 
Lord Hoffmann has attempted to argue that the threshold criterion between the two 
categories is equivalent to the distinction between objective and subjective material, 
i.e. that the surrounding circumstances are objective, whereas prior communings are 
‘drenched in subjectivity’.85 It is submitted that this appears to be a rather blunt and 
simplistic approach which may break down at the margins. The same challenge of 
establishing a threshold criterion exists in drawing the distinction between evidence of 
subsequent conduct and surrounding circumstances.86 These classificatory issues will 
continue to exist so long as material which is labelled as prior communings and 
subsequent conduct is deemed to be an irrelevant consideration. 
 
The question which remains is the extent to which interpretative techniques such as 
the surrounding circumstances, factual matrix, background knowledge and the 
commercially sensible construction which are comprised within the objective measure 
of scrutiny lead to unwarranted and excessive judicial creativity. The writer’s answer 
to this question is clear: On balance the current approach does not foster or promote 
excessive judicial creativity or the narrowing of the importance or role of party 
autonomy. The justifications for this view are that the presence of subjective factors 
are sufficiently powerful to (i) offset the effects caused by the inadmissibility of 
subjective elements such as prior communings and subsequent conduct and (ii) chisel 
away at some of the creative urges which the overall objective theory of contractual 
interpretation may tempt the judiciary into applying. A related point to be addressed is 
whether the dynamics of the objective approach empower the courts to re-write 
contracts leading to the elision of party consent and autonomy? It is suggested that 
there is no uniform response to this question which holds in all cases and the writer  is 
sceptical or at best, agnostic, about the prescience of any accusation that party consent 
is marginalised by the objective and contextual approach. Since legal formalism in 
this area of law has been rejected, different interpretative techniques will be afforded 
precedence in various cases. As argued by the writer before,87 it is counter-productive 
to conceptualise the objective approach in terms of fixed rules espousing a hierarchy 
of interpretative criteria. Instead, the author is of the view that how the range of 
interpretative criteria are applied from case to case ought to be understood in terms of 
a casuistic, rather than dogmatically rigid process, with the relevant criterion or 
criteria selected being dependent on its or their relevancy to the interpretative 
endeavour in a given case. For example, the application of a commercially sensible 
                                                
84 See Reardon Smith Line v Hansen-Tagen [1976] WLR 989 at 995H per Lord Wilberforce, Bank of 
Scotland v Dunedin Property Investment Co Ltd. 1998 SC 657 at 665 per Lord Rodger, Howgate 
Shopping Centre Ltd. v GLS 164 Ltd. 2002 SLT 820, 825 at para. [23] per Lord Macfadyen, City Wall 
Properties (Scotland) Ltd. v Pearl Assurance plc [2007] CSIH 79 at para. [22] per Lord Phillip and 
Luminar Lava Ignite Ltd v Mama Group & Mean Fiddler [2009] CSOH 68, 2009 GWD 19-305 at para. 
[14] per Lord Glennie. Recently, it has been endorsed resoundingly by Lord Hoffman in the House of 
Lords in Chartbrook Ltd. v Persimmon Homes Ltd. [2009] UKHL 38; [2009] 1 AC 1101, 1117F-1119F 
at paras. [33]-[38]. 
85 See Chartbrook Ltd. v Persimmon Homes Ltd. [2009] UKHL 38; [2009] 1 AC 1101, 1119B-F at 
para. [38]. See also the approach in Luminar Lava Ignite Ltd v Mama Group plc & Mean Fiddler 
Holdings Ltd. [2010] CSIH 01; 2010 G.W.D. 3-39 at paras. [41]-[45] per Lord Hodge. 
86 See Cameron (Scotland) Ltd v Melville Dundas Ltd 2001 SCLR 691, 695-696 at paras. [30]-[31] per 
Lord Hamilton and Wincanton Group Ltd v Reid Furniture plc [2008] CSOH; 2008 GWD 29-446, at 
para. [16] per Lord Glennie. 
87 D. Cabrelli, “The Effect of Past and Subsisting Breaches on Contractual Rights” [2009] 13 
Edinburgh Law Review 293. 
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construction may be wholly inapposite where the contract captures a non-commercial 
arrangement. In such circumstances, the appropriate response may be to attach greater 
weight to the surrounding circumstances or alternatively, the text itself. In another 
case, the surrounding circumstances may reveal little, yet the commercial objective of 
a clause may be clear.88 A further possibility is that both criteria may prove to shed no 
light whatsoever, in which case, the natural and ordinary meaning of the words will be 
applied. In such matters, the dynamics can be summarised in the layperson’s motif of 
‘horses for courses’. Furthermore, a natural rein ought also to be placed on any 
potential excessive judicial creativity by the need to confine the scope of enquiries to 
the matters averred and narrated in the parties’ written pleadings and the need for the 
court to adopt a construction which is reflective of the understanding of the 
reasonable person who has stepped into the shoes of the parties. Where two 
competing interpretations are equally plausible, the requirement to adopt the persona 
of the objective reasonable person should channel the court towards a process which 
examines their relative workability and the construction which is more workable than 
the other should be preferred.89 
 
However, the above is subject to a particular caveat. That is to say that the 
interpretative tool of the ‘commercially sensible construction’ may be a double-edged 
sword. A liberal deployment of such an instrument may lead to the elision of the 
significance of compromise if it is acknowledged that it represents a facet of consent 
and party autonomy. In Credential Bath Street Ltd v Venture Investment Placement 
Ltd.90 and Forbo-Nairn Ltd. v Murrayfield Properties Ltd.91 both Lords Reed and 
Hodge highlighted the fact that the courts need to be alive to the danger that the 
commercially sensible construction might be applied to supersede a bad bargain 
which has been agreed by a party through the dynamics of compromise and 
concession in the commercial negotiation process. The writer would also add that this 
danger is compounded by the fact that the scope for concession and compromise to be 
revealed in court is constrained since evidence of pre-contractual negotiations 
continues to be inadmissible post-Chartbrook Ltd. v Persimmon Homes Ltd.92 For this 
reason alone, the writer is in favour of the lifting of the embargo on pre-contractual 
negotiations. This would enable direct evidence of concessions and compromise to be 
pleaded which would circumscribe the potential for the commercially sensible 
construction to operate as an ‘unruly horse’. 
 
One example where it is perfectly possible (but not certain) that the commercially 
sensible construction may have superseded an express term which found its way into 
the contract through concession and compromise is the case of Macdonald Estates plc 
v Regenesis (2005) Dunfermline Ltd.93 Here, one will recall that it was held that where 
a property owner had agreed to pay a property developer a fee for certain Services, 
some of which it would require sub-contractors to perform, it made no commercial 
                                                
88 For example, see Trygort (Number 2) Limited v UK Home Finance Ltd. [2008] CSIH 56, 2008 SLT 
1065. 
89 Luminar Lava Ignite Ltd v Mama Group plc & Mean Fiddler Holdings Ltd. [2010] CSIH 01; 2010 
G.W.D. 3-39 at para. [15] per Lord Eassie. 
90 2008 Hous. L.R. 2, 11 at paras. [36]-[37] per Lord Reed. 
91 CSOH 47 at para. [13] per Lord Hodge. The case of Forbo-Nairn Ltd. v Murrayfield Properties Ltd. 
[2009] CSIH 94 was appealed to the Inner House, but the Inner House did not overturn Lord Reed’s 
decision. 
92 [2009] UKHL 38; [2009] 1 AC 1101. 
93 2007 SLT 791. 
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sense for the terms of the contract to be construed in a manner which also required the 
property owner to reimburse the property developer in respect of professional and 
other costs which the property developer had incurred in employing third parties. 
Here, there is an argument that Lord Reed may have engaged the interpretative 
construct of the ‘commercially sensible construction’ in a manner which may have (i) 
departed from the commercial realities of the property development market or (ii) 
overlooked the fact that what appeared to be an onerous commitment may well have 
been conceded in return for agreement on another or more important provision of the 
same contract. For example, it would be unusual for a property developer to engage 
in-house professionals and consultants and so it was more or less inevitable that it 
would have to instruct outside third parties for professional advice. To that extent, it 
may have been wholly legitimate for the JVCo to agree to indemnify the property 
developer in respect of such costs, duly reflecting the realities of the marketplace94  
 
An alternative objection to the prominence of the commercially sensible construction 
is that it assumes that the judiciary are sufficiently equipped to engage in commercial 
decision-making. It is suggested that this may be somewhat misplaced, something 
which the judiciary themselves have not been inhibited from reminding themselves in 
the past.95 The writer would submit that the risk is that the construct of the 
commercially sensible construction develops into something of an ‘unruly horse’ 
which cannot be reined in once the stable door has bolted. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons advanced in this paper, it is contended that the adoption of an 
increasingly objective approach towards the construction of contracts is not 
necessarily consistent with the marginalisation of the importance of the role of 
consent in contract law. However, this is subject to the peril that the commercially 
sensible construction may evolve into something which overshadows the other 
interpretative tools and operates to suppress the significance of consent articulated 
through concession and compromise. An altogether different and more pressing issue 
is the effect of the current approach to construction upon commercial certainty. 
Amongst legal practitioners96 and law and economics scholars,97 the current objective 
approach is less than popular for the uncertainty and inefficiencies which it generates 
in commercial contracting.98 The writer would end with the simple observation that 
there is an air of inevitability about the emergence of more objective criteria such as 
the commercially sensible construction and surrounding circumstances as the 
dynamics of the commercial contracting process becomes more and more complex 
                                                
94 I am thankful to my colleague Laura Macgregor for the identification of this point. 
95 The World Symphony [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 115. 117 per Lord Donaldson MR, Capital Land 
Holdings Ltd. v Secretary of State for the Environment, 16 May 1995 per Lord Penrose and Credential 
Bath Street Ltd v Venture Investment Placement Ltd. 2008 Hous. L.R. 2, 8-9 at para. [24]. 
96 R. Calnan, “Construction of Commercial Contracts: A Practitioner’s Perspective” in  
A Burrows and E Peel (eds.) Contract Terms (Oxford, OUP, 2007) 17, 18-20 
97 A. Schwartz & R. E. Scott, “Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law” 113 Yale Law Journal 
541 (2003). 
98 A suggestion worthy of consideration is whether the relationship between certainty and formation, 
interpretation, implication of terms and rectification in contract law might represent a fruitful source of 
discussion and debate amongst academics, practitioners and members of the judiciary at a future 
workshop or conference. 
 17 
and influenced by technology. That is to say, that the prevalence of subjective criteria 
are inversely proportional to the complexity of contracts.99  
                                                
99 See the discussion in G. McMeel, The Construction of Contracts: Interpretation, Implication and 
Rectification (Oxford, OUP, 2007) 35 at para. 1.77. R Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman 
Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Capetown: Juta, 1990) 634; Report on Interpretation in Private 
Law (Scot Law Com No. 160) (1997) paras. 1.15 and 1.18 at pp. 4-5. E. Clive, “Interpretation”, in K. 
Reid and R. Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland (Oxford, OUP, 2000), vol. 2, 
Chap. 2 at p. 49. 
